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Sequential Traitor Tracing
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Member, IEEE,and Yejing Wang
Abstract—We consider a new type of traitor tracing scheme,
called sequential traitor tracing, that protects against rebroad-
casting of decrypted content. Sequential traceability (TA) schemes
trace all up to traitors and remove the shortcomings of dynamic
tracing schemes. We give two general constructions and show the
relationship between -TA codes and sequential tracing schemes.
Index Terms—Error-correcting codes, fingerprinting, traitor
tracing.
I. INTRODUCTION
T RAITOR tracing is studied in different contexts. Inbroad-cast encryption[1], the information is broadcasted to a
set of authorized receivers. Each receiver has a decoder with a
unique key that allows him to decrypt the encrypted broadcast.
Traitor tracing schemes protect against a pirate decoder that is
constructed by a group of colluders that use their key informa-
tion to illegally decrypt the broadcast. Traitor tracing is also used
in the context of data fingerprinting, where colluders use their
copies of a digital object to construct a pirate copy of the object;
again the aim is to trace one of the colluders.
Dynamic tracing [2], [3] considers the scenario where the
content is broadcasted to a group of authorized receivers. Here,
the colluders do not construct a pirate decoder but decrypt the
content and rebroadcast it. A simple solution to trace the source
of rebroadcast is to embed a different watermark for each re-
ceiver and trace the source of rebroadcast by examining the
embedded watermark in the rebroadcast. This solution, how-
ever, requires one copy of content for each user and so requires
very high bandwidth. Dynamic tracing [2] allows tracing all col-
luders with much lower bandwidth. The basic idea is to break
time into consecutive intervals and modify the watermarking
strategy of the system in each interval using the rebroadcasted
content. After observing the rebroadcast for long enough time,
one or more colluders can be traced. The identified colluders are
disconnected from the system and the system proceeds until all
colluders are found one by one and get disconnected. Dynamic
tracing has two main drawbacks. First, it is completely ineffec-
tive against an attack, calleddelayed rebroadcast, in which the
attackers rebroadcast the content with some delay. Under this at-
tack not even a single colluder can be found. Second, it requires
high real-time computation and so is not suitable for systems
with a large number of users. Sequential tracing, first proposed
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in [4], removes these two shortcomings by tracing at least one
colluder if delayed rebroadcast attack is used and substantially
reducing the real-time computation cost. This paper is an ex-
tended and corrected version of that paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall dy-
namic tracing and point out its shortcomings. In Section III, we
introduce the model of sequential tracing, and in Sections IV
and V, describe two constructions, one based on function fami-
lies and the other based on error-correcting codes. In Section VI,
we investigate the relationship between sequential-traceability
(TA) schemes and-TA codes. In Section VII, we provide a
bound on the size of collusion for codes that are obtained from
error-correcting codes. In Section VIII, we discuss our results
and propose possible extensions.
II. DYNAMIC TRACING
A -ary watermarking system withmark set
consists of two algorithms: anembedding
algorithm that embeds one of themarks in a content, and
a detection algorithm that takes a content and outputs one
of the marks, or “?.” To provide protection against removal
of the mark, the two algorithms may use the same secret key
information. We assume the watermarking system isrobust
and the embedded mark cannot be changed or removed. An
example of such scheme is thespread-spectrum techniqueof
Cox et al. [5].
In dynamic tracing [2], [3], thecontentis divided into con-
secutivesegments, for example, one minute interval in an audio
track. A watermarking algorithm is used to embed one of the
marks in the segment, hence creatingversionsof the segment.
In each interval, the user group is divided intosubsets and
each subset receives one version of the segment. The subsets are
varied in each interval using the rebroadcasted content. It is as-
sumed that there is an efficient group key management scheme
that allows the broadcaster to efficiently regroup the receivers
in each interval and securely deliver their allocated version. Fiat
and Tassa proved [2], [3] that for tracingtraitors at least
versions must be used, and gave algorithms that use and
versions and require and steps,
respectively, to findall colluders, that isto converge. Berkman
et al. [6], [7] improved these results and showed an algorithm
with , , versions and steps
for convergence, and a second one with , , versions
and steps for convergence. The main aim of these
works has been to construct schemes with the smallest number
of steps for convergence when the number of versions is close
to the lower bound .
Dynamic tracing has two major shortcomings. The first short-
coming is that regrouping of the users and mark allocation to
users in each interval depends on the rebroadcasted content,
0018-9448/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE
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also calledfeedbackfrom the channel. This means that if there
is no feedback from the channel no regrouping will occur and
so the system is vulnerable to adelayed rebroadcast attack. In
this attack, the attackers do not immediately rebroadcast, but
record the content and rebroadcast it with some delay and so
the broadcaster has no alternative but keeping the mark alloca-
tion unchanged. With this attack the system fails completely and
cannot trace any colluder.
The second shortcoming of the system is high real-time
computation for regrouping the users and allocating marks to
subsets. This means that the length of a segment cannot be very
short. In dynamic tracing, the number of segments required
by the algorithm to converge grows with the number of users.
Hence, to trace colluders given a fixed length content, the length
of the segment must reduce as the size of the user population
grows. On the other hand, the computation for repartitioning
the group and allocating the versions grows with the size of the
group and because of the real-time nature of the computation,
the length of the segment cannot be decreased. The conflicting
requirements on the segment size, that is, requiring shorter
length to provide for longer convergence length, and at the
same time the need to have it longer to give time for real-time
computation, would result in unworkable systems for large
groups.
III. SEQUENTIAL TRACING
We consider the same scenario as dynamic tracing and
propose a different solution which removes the above short-
comings. In sequential tracing, the channel feedback is only
used for tracing andnot for allocation of marks to users.
Similar to dynamic tracing, the system can trace all colluders.
The mark allocation table is predefined and there is no need
for real-time computation to determine the mark allocation of
the next interval. Other computations related to key manage-
ment of the group can be all performed as precomputation
and so the need for real-time computation will be minimized.
Mark allocation in each interval will be according to the table
irrespective of the channel feedback. Using a predefined table
also protects against the delayed rebroadcast attack, however,
the tracing ability of the system will reduce to one traitor.
That is, even if the rebroadcast is delayed until the whole
content is received, still once colluders start rebroadcasting
at least one of them will be traced. We call the systemse-
quential traitor tracing schemeto emphasise the fact that the
traitors are identified sequentially, that is, when a colluder is
found he is disconnected and the system proceeds to trace
the remaining colluders, and at the same time differentiate it
from dynamic schemes.
System Description
In sequential tracing, theprotected contentis divided intoseg-
ments. A -ary watermarking system is used to producever-
sions of each segment. Let denote the
set of users, and be the mark set. Amark al-
location table is an array over with rows and columns
where is the mark allocated to the user in segment
. In the th time interval, the broadcaster uses theth column
of to allocate marks to users. A colluding groupchooses
one of their versions and rebroadcasts it. The tracer intercepts
the rebroadcast, extracts the mark, and appends it to a sequence,
calledfeedback sequence. Let denote a colluding group,
and
A feedback sequence is called -feed-
back sequenceif there exists a , , such that
for . After observing a certain
number of segments from a feedback sequence, the tracer iden-
tifies one traitor (or more traitors) and disconnects him from
the system, that is, excludes him from future broadcasts. The
tracer continues observing the rebroadcast and identifying other
traitor(s) who will be disconnected in a similar way. After ob-
serving elements of the feedback sequence, all traitors are
found and the tracing algorithm converges, hereis thecon-
vergence lengthof the algorithm. Let denote the subsequence
consisting of the first elements of .
Definition 1: A sequential -TA scheme consists of a mark
allocation table and a tracing algorithm with the following
properties:
1) is an array with entries from ;
2) is a mapping
such that for any -feedback sequence, there exists a
sequence of integers
such that
,
otherwise
(1)
and
(2)
The colluders are identified in steps, where depends
on the feedback sequence and because it is possible
to identify more than one colluder in one step. The working
of a sequential -TA scheme, denoted by , can be
summarized as follows.
Set
While and
For
Send version to
If there is feedback
Extract
Append to
If
disconnect users in
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Disconnecting a user (or a group) means that they cannot
contribute to future rebroadcasts and the feedback sequence
will not have their contributions. Three parameters, , and
measure communication efficiency of the system. Parameter
is the number of versions of a segment and so highermeans
more versions and higher bandwidth for sending the segment.
Parameter is the convergence lengthof the system and its
higher value means more segments are required to trace all
traitors. Parameter is the maximum number of traitors the
system tolerates.
Intuitively, there is a tradeoff between these two parameters.
That is, using more versions would allow shorter convergence
length. In Section VII, we give an expression that relates these
three parameters when the mark allocation table is derived from
an error-correcting code. In the following two sections, we de-
scribe two constructions of sequential TA schemes.
IV. A CONSTRUCTIONUSING A FUNCTION FAMILY
This construction identifies one of thecolluders in
steps, andall colluders in at most steps. That is, the
scheme converges in steps and the convergence length is
independent of the size of the user group. However, the number
of versions is proportional to the group size and so for large
groups requires high bandwidth. We will show (Section VIII)
that the scheme can be recursively used to increase the number
of users while the number of versions is kept fixed. This will be
at the cost of higher convergence length.
A. Mark Allocation Table
Let be the mark set,and be integers,
where . Consider a collection of mappings
where
satisfies the following two properties.
(P1) For a fixed , and a pair of the first indexes ,
, we have for all .
(P2) For a pair of the first indexes , and a pair
of the second indexes with , if
we have ,
for all , .
Let and , , be the following
matrices:
...
...
Define a mark allocation table as follows:
...
...
...
...
...
(3)
That is, has block rows, each containing rows. Each row is
allocated to a user and denotes theth row of the th block
row. For a feedback sequence , we say
and have matchesif there exist indexes
such that
Let denote the number of matches betweenand .
Define a tracing function as follows:
(4)
The tracing algorithm can be implemented by attaching a
counter to each row. The counter records the number of
matches between a row and. In step , is received from
the channel. The row counters of rows that havein their
th position will be incremented. When a row counter reaches
, the corresponding user is identified as a traitor and is
disconnected from future broadcast. Letbe the following
integer:
(5)
Theorem 1: The mark allocation table and the tracing
function , as defined in (3) and (4), respectively, define a se-
quential -TA scheme for users. The convergence
length is and is given in (5).
The proof of this theorem uses Lemmas 1 and 2 that follow.
Lemma 1: Let
(6)
be a -feedback sequence produced by , . Sup-
pose . Then .
Proof: Assume and . Suppose
corresponds to the row of . Consider the positions
that and match. Since is constructed by and
, there must be a colluder who has contributed two segments in
that positions. Let the two segments beand , .
That is, there is that matches in positions ,
and hence matches in positions and . Because of the
structure of , we have one of the following two cases:
1) which gives
or
2) which gives
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The first case contradicts (P1). The second case contradicts (P2)
as .
Corollary 1: i) Tracing one traitor requires segments
from the traitor. ii) Tracing traitors in a single step requires at
most segments from them.
Proof: Part i) is a direct corollary of Lemma 1. To prove
Part ii), we note that if then is a traitor.
If in segment , traitors are simultaneously identified, it must
be the case that theusers have simultaneously reached
matches with the-feedback sequence , and so each of the
users have matches with . The number is bounded
by and so tracing traitors in a single step requires
segments.
Consider a -feedback sequence. Let . For , if
such that
define
such that
(7)
Lemma 2: Let be a -feedback se-
quence and be defined in (7). Then,
for .
Proof: Let be the collusion produced and
For , define
From (4) we have . Applying Corollary 1 we obtain that
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1:Consider defined in
(7). Using Lemma 2, we have as . If is given
by (5), then . That is, . So is a
sequential -TA scheme. The number of usersis the number
of rows of and is equal to .
B. Existence of
The construction in Section IV-A uses a function family
that satisfies properties (P1) and (P2). In the following, we give
a construction for .
Theorem 2: Let be a prime number, .
Define a function family as
follows:
Then, satisfies properties (P1) and (P2).
Proof: If , then for all
and so (P1) is satisfied. Assume . Then
we have and so if we have
. This implies , and
hence (P2) is satisfied.
The mark allocation table resulting fromin Theorem 2 will
have rows and columns,
and will be a sequential-TA scheme with
For given and , must be chosen such that
and and so
C. An Example
Example 1: To provide protection for 50 users against collu-
sion of up to two colluders, , we need in Theorem 2 to
be . will have five block rows, each with 10 rows as shown
at the top of the following page.
Suppose users and are the colluders, and assume
the feedback sequence is . We expect
to identify the first colluder after observing at most
segments. That is after observing at most five segments, there
will be at least one row that will match the feedback sequence
in positions while all other rows will have at most
matches. We note that lengthcorresponds to the worst
(longest) case when both colluders have attempted to remain un-
known for the longest period. However, it means that when the
first colluder is identified (three matches), the other one has al-
ready two matches with and will be caught after observing
the next segment. The following table lists columns that match
a particular segment in the feedback sequence. After observing
five segments of the feedback sequence, the colluder will
have three matches and will be disconnected. The colluder
has appeared only twice which is the same number as some
of the innocent users, for example, . After observing the
sixth element of the feedback sequence, this colluder will also
be identified.
V. CONSTRUCTIONFROM ERROR-CORRECTINGCODES
Mark allocation tables can be obtained from error-correcting
codes by using each codeword as a row of the table.
Definition 2: An -error-correcting code, or
-ECC for short, is a set of codewords of length
over an alphabet of sizeand having the minimum Hamming
distance between any pair of codewords equal to.
The mark allocation table in (3) corresponds to an error-
correcting code with . A general construction from
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Mark Allocation Table for Example 1
an error-correcting code is given in Theorem 3. We need the
following lemmas.
Lemma 3: Let be an -ECC and
(8)
be a -feedback sequence produced by , . If
, then .
Proof: Let and matches in po-
sitions. Then, there exists a such that and have at
least matches within these positions, and so
This shows that .
For an -ECC, define a tracing function
as
(9)
Corollary 2: The tracing function (9) for an -
ECC has the following properties.
i) Tracing one traitor requires segments from
a traitor.
ii) Tracing traitors in a single step requires at most
segments from them.
Proof: Property i) is a direct corollary of Lemma 3. To
prove property ii), we note that if
then is a traitor. If in segment, traitors are simultaneously
identified it means that theusers have reached
matches with the-feedback sequence simultaneously, and
so each of the users have matches with . The
number is bounded by , so tracing traitors
in a single step requires segments.
Consider a -feedback sequence. Let . For , if
s.t.
define
s. t. (10)
Lemma 4: Let be a -feedback se-
quence and be defined as in (10). Then
for .
Proof: Suppose is produced by . Let
For , define
From (9), we have . Applying Corollary 2 we
obtain that
which proves the lemma.
Theorem 3: Let be an integer, denote a mark allocation
table obtained from an -ECC satisfying
(11)
and be defined as in (9). Then is a sequential -TA
scheme.
Proof: Consider defined in (10). Using
Lemma 4, we have . The condition (11)
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gives and so is a sequential-TA
scheme.
Theorem 3 shows that sequential tracing schemes can be con-
structed from -ary error-correcting codes with large minimum
distances and
Examples of codes that satisfy (11) are given in what follows.
Reed–Solomon Codes
A Reed–Solomon code (RS-code) over GFis a linear code
with , , and codewords. An
RS-code defines a mark allocation table for a sequential-TA
scheme with
Algebraic-Geometry Codes
An algebraic-geometry code (AG-code) over GF, denoted
by , is a linear code of length ,
where and are the dimension of the code
and the genus of the algebraic curve, respectively. It is known
[8] that AG-codes with parameters exist,
if there exists an algebraic curve of genusover GF having
rational points. For , the curves of genus are elliptic
curves which are known to exist for any and any
where and is defined as
is odd
else.
When , the curve of genus exists for any and
any , where and is given as follows.
If
.
If
nonspecial
special,
special,
Here isspecialmeans that either or is of the forms:
, , or for some integer.
An AG-code defines the mark allocation table of a sequential
-TA scheme for which
Low-Rate Codes
Theorem 4 ([9, Lemma III.3]):For positive integers , let
. Then there exists an -ECC where
.
The code in Theorem 4 defines the mark allocation table of a
sequential -TA scheme for which
VI. SEQUENTIAL -TRACEABILITY SCHEMES AND -TA CODES
Mark allocation table in a sequential TA scheme is closely
related to TA codes.
Definition 3 [10]: Let be a -ary code, and be an integer,
be a collusion of size , where
. Define
Then is called a -TA code if the following condition is satis-
fied: for any for some with
, there is a such that
for any .
Staddonet al. [10] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Let be an -ECC, and be an in-
teger. If
(12)
then is a -TA code.
For an -ECC, let denote the -
ECC obtained from by restricting each codeword to its first
components.
Theorem 6: Let be sequential-TA scheme obtained from
an -ECC with satisfying (11). Then, there exists
a sequence of integers such that
, , is a -TA code.
Proof: Let . That is,
The minimum Hamming distance of satisfies
From Theorem 5, is a -TA code.
Corollary 3: Mark allocation table of a sequential-TA
scheme is a-TA code.
VII. A SYMPTOTIC BOUNDS
Intuitively, we expect a tradeoff among, , and . That is, we
expect higher bandwidth results in a shorter convergence length.
In the following, we give a relation between these parameters for
mark allocation tables that are based on error-correcting codes.
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Theorem 7 (Plotkin Bound, [11]):For an -ECC,
if , then
The following Theorem shows a bound onfor a sequential
-TA scheme obtained from an -ECC with sat-
isfying (11). This bound was stated in [12] for a-TA obtained
from an -ECC with satisfying (12). Here, we give
an alternative proof.
Theorem 8: Let be an integer, be an -ECC
with satisfying (11) and . Then
for sufficiently large .
Proof: Assume otherwise, that is,
This implies that , or equivalently
If satisfies (11), then
Applying Theorem 7, we have
and so
Note that
For sufficiently large
gives a contradiction as is an integer.
VIII. D ISCUSSION
As noted earlier, for a fixed-size group there is a tradeoff be-
tween the alphabet size and the convergence length. That is, for
shorter convergence length larger alphabet size is required. In
the following, we show a method of composing TA codes that
results in systems for larger group sizes while keeping the al-
phabet size constant but increasing the convergence length.
An code over a -ary alphabet is a subset of
of size . With this definition, a -TA code and a mark allo-
cation table of a sequential-TA scheme are codes over-ary
alphabets.
Let be a -ary code and be an -ary
code. Define thecompositionof the two codes to be
a -ary code obtained by i) associating each codeword of
with a symbol in the alphabet set of and ii) in each codeword
of , replacing symbols by their associated codewords of.
The code will be a -ary code of length with
codewords. We refer to and as theinner and theouter
code, respectively.
Theorem 9: Let and be a -ary code and
an -ary code, respectively, and let denote the
composition of the inner code and the outer code . Suppose
is a -TA code and is a sequential-TA scheme. Then is
an sequential -TA scheme over a-ary alphabet.
Proof: Let be the mark allocation table of a sequential
-TA scheme and assume there is a group ofcolluders. We
construct a sequential tracing algorithm for.
The algorithm starts by initializing the feedback sequence
. The rebroadcasted content is considered in blocks of
segments. Each block represents a pirate word in. Using
the tracing algorithm of , the block is traced to one of the col-
luders and hence a symbol in alphabet associated with the
colluder. This symbol is appended to to form the feedback
sequence of . Now the tracing algorithm of is employed
to trace colluders.
The correctness of the tracing algorithm follows from the cor-
rectness of the tracing algorithms of and .
Theorem 6 showed that a sequential TA code is a-TA code.
This means that the codeobtained above can be used as a-TA
code and be composed with a sequential-TA scheme again. By
repeating the composition times, one can construct a-ary
sequential -TA scheme where .
A. Delayed Rebroadcast
Sequential tracing alleviates delayed rebroadcast attack.
The mark allocation of each interval is determined solely by a
column of the mark allocation table and does not depend on the
feedback from the channel. The broadcaster follows the mark
allocation table even if there is no rebroadcast. In the worst
case, the colluders wait for the broadcast to be completed and
then start the rebroadcast. This is the same as the traditional
TA systems and since a sequential tracing scheme is a-TA
code then at least one of the colluders can be found. In fact,
the first segments of the content can be used to identify
a colluder. However, tracing more than one colluder requires
the contribution of the traced one to be removed from the
remaining content which is not possible in this case and so the
system guarantees one colluder to be found. This is in contrast
to the dynamic scheme that will become completely insecure
against this attack.
B. Time–Bandwidth Tradeoff
Two important efficiency parameters of dynamic traitor
tracing schemes are i) the number of markswhich determines
the communication efficiency of the system, and ii) the con-
vergence length . Fiat and Tassa, and later Berkmanet al. [6]
concentrated on the communication efficiency and presented
efficient algorithms when is close to its theoretical minimum
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. Berkmanet al.showed that if , , it
is possible to find traitors in steps. Schemes
constructed in Section V (for example, the one obtained from
Theorem 4) use versions and require steps
to converge, where .
In Theorem 9 we showed a way of trading convergence length
with alphabet size. It is worth noting that the actual convergence
time is the product of the length of a segment and the conver-
gence length. As noted earlier, sequential tracing reduces the
real-time computation and so can use shorter segments. How-
ever, the actual convergence time in these schemes might be
lower in practice.
C. Conclusions
Sequential TA schemes fit between static and dynamic TA
schemes. The application scenario in sequential schemes and
dynamic schemes are the same and is different from static-TA
schemes. Also, the goal of the former two is the same (tracing
all traitors) and is different from-TA schemes in which the
aim is to identify one colluder. Sequential schemes do not use
the feedback from the channel to allocate marks and so in gen-
eral would require higher bandwidth and a higher number of
segments to converge. However, they provide security against
delayed rebroadcast attack and reduce the real-time computa-
tion. The main construction of sequential TA schemes is by
using error-correcting codes with large minimum distance. We
showed that the mark allocation table in a sequential TA scheme
gives a sequence of-TA schemes. Determining necessary and
sufficient conditions for -TA schemes to be used as sequential
-TA schemes is an interesting open problem.
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